Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of market-wide changes in health insurance by examining the single largest change in health insurance coverage in American history: the introduction of Medicare in 1965. I estimate that the impact of Medicare on hospital spending is over six times larger than what the evidence from individual-level changes in health insurance would have predicted. This disproportionately larger effect may arise if market-wide changes in demand alter the incentives of hospitals to incur the fixed costs of entering the market or of adopting new practice styles. I present some evidence of these types of effects. A back of the envelope calculation based on the estimated impact of Medicare suggests that the overall spread of health insurance between 1950 and 1990 may be able to explain about half of the increase in real per capita health spending over this time period.
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Over the last half-century, the dramatic rise in medical expenditures has been one of the most salient features of the U.S. health care sector. Total health care expenditures in the United States as a share of GDP have more than tripled, from about 5 percent in 1960 to about 16 percent in [CMS 2004 .
Early work by Feldstein [1971 Feldstein [ , 1977 suggested that the spread of health insurance was a primary cause of the rapid rise in health spending. Such arguments prompted the undertaking of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, one of the largest randomized, individual-level social experiments ever conducted in the United States, to investigate the impact of health insurance on health care utilization and spending [Manning et al. 1987] . Its findings suggested that the responsiveness of health spending to health insurance was substantially smaller than what Feldstein [1971 Feldstein [ , 1977 had estimated, and consequently, that the spread of health insurance was not an important cause of the rise in health spending (Manning et al. [1987] , Newhouse et al. [1993] , Newhouse [1992] ). Today, the results of the Rand Experiment are generally accepted as the gold standard, and are widely used in both academic and applied contexts (Cutler and Zeckhauser [2000] , Zweifel and Manning [2000] ).
This paper revisits this debate and suggests that the spread of health insurance may have played a much larger role in the growth of health spending than the Rand Experiment would suggest. The basic insight is that market-wide changes in health insurance may have fundamentally different effects on the health care sector than what partial equilibrium analyses such as the Rand Experiment would suggest.
To study the impact of market-wide changes in health insurance, I examine the impact of the introduction of Medicare in 1965. Medicare's introduction constituted the single largest change in health insurance coverage in American history. Medicare is currently one of the largest health insurance programs in the world, providing health insurance to 40 million people and comprising one-eighth of the federal budget and 2 percent of GDP (National Center for Health Statistics [2002] , Newhouse [2002] , US Congress [2000] ). Yet we know surprisingly little about the impact of its introduction. Indeed, to my knowledge, the only existing evidence comes from a comparison of time series patterns of health expenditures before and after its introduction [Feldstein and Taylor 1977] .
I use the fact that the elderly in different regions of the country had very different rates of private health insurance coverage prior to Medicare to identify its effect. I study the impact of Medicare on the hospital sector. This was the single largest component of health spending at the time of Medicare's introduction and of the subsequent growth in health spending. My estimates suggest that, in its first five years, the introduction of Medicare was associated with an increase in spending that was over six times larger than what the estimates from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment would have predicted. They also suggest that the long-term impact of Medicare may have been even larger than its five-year impact.
One reason why the general-equilibrium impact of a market-wide change in health insurance may be much larger than what partial-equilibrium analysis would suggest is that market-wide changes in health insurance can fundamentally alter the nature and character of medical practice in ways that small-scale changes will not. Consistent with this, I find that the introduction of Medicare is associated with substantial new hospital entry. I also find some suggestive evidence that Medicare's introduction is associated with increased adoption of cardiac technologies and increased spending on non-Medicare patients; however due to data limitations discussed below, these results are necessarily more speculative in nature than the other findings of the paper.
Extrapolation from the Rand estimates of the impact of health insurance on health spending suggests that the overall spread of health insurance between 1950 and 1990 can explain only a very small part of the six-fold rise in real per capita health spending over this period (Manning et al. [1987] , Newhouse [1992] ). The results of the same exercise using my estimated impact of Medicare suggest that the spread of health insurance may be able to explain half of the increase in health spending over this period. Of course, important concerns about external validity suggest that the findings of each of these back of the envelope calculations should be viewed with considerable caution. Nonetheless, at a broad level, my findings raise the possibility that the spread of health insurance -and the public policies that encouraged it -may have played a much larger role in the substantial growth in the health care sector over the last half century than the current conventional wisdom suggests. At the same, however, my findings are not inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that technological change is the primary cause of the rapid rise in health expenditures (e.g. Newhouse [1992] , Fuchs [1996] , and Cutler [2003] ). The large impact of market-wide changes in health insurance on health spending may stem in part from their impact on decisions to adopt new medical technologies, as conjectured by Weisbrod [1991] .
A complete picture of the impact of an aggregate change in health insurance requires an understanding not only of its impact on the health care sector -the subject of this paper -but also of its benefits to consumers. In related work, Finkelstein and McKnight [2005] explore these potential benefits.
We find that while the introduction of Medicare appears to have had no impact on elderly mortality in its first ten years, it did substantially reduce the right tail of out of pocket medical spending by the elderly.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section one describe the data and empirical strategy.
Section two presents estimates of the effect of Medicare on the hospital sector. Section three shows that these estimates are substantially larger than what existing partial equilibrium estimates would have predicted; it also presents some evidence in support of the likely explanations. Section four provides a back of the envelope calculation for what the estimates imply for the contribution of the spread of health insurance to the growth of the health care sector over the last half century. The last section concludes.
I. Studying the impact of Medicare: Approach and Data

I.A. Identifying the impact of Medicare: geographic variation in pre-Medicare insurance coverage
Medicare, enacted July 1 1965 and implemented July 1 1966, provided universal public health insurance coverage for the elderly. It covered hospital and physician expenses; the services covered and the reimbursement rates were very generous for the time (Somers and Somers [1967] , Newhouse [2002] ).
Prior to Medicare, public health insurance coverage was practically non existent, and meaningful private health insurance for the elderly was also relatively rare (Stevens and Stevens [1974] , United States Senate [1963] , Anderson and Anderson [1967] , and Epstein and Murray, [1967] ). Based on data from the 1963 National Health Survey (NHS), I estimate that in 1963, only 25 percent of the elderly had meaningful (i.e. Blue Cross) private hospital insurance.
1 Upon the implementation of Medicare, hospital insurance coverage for the elderly rose virtually instantaneously to almost 100 percent [US HEW, 1969] .
1 Most private insurance at this time was extremely minimalist in nature, but Blue Cross plans had relatively comprehensive coverage (e.g. Anderson et al. [1963] , Stevens and Stevens [1974] ). For more information on the 1963 NHS, see NCHS [1964] . I am extremely grateful to Will Dow for his work unearthing these data. However, the historical data have been largely ignored.
I exclude the approximately five percent of hospitals that are federally owned, producing a sample of about 6,500 hospitals per year. The analysis centers on six hospital outcomes: total expenditures, payroll expenditures, employment, beds, admissions and patient days. Utilization and bed data are exclusive of newborns. I convert all expenditure variables to 1960 dollars using the CPI-U. Hospital expenditures consist of expenditures on inputs, and do not reflect hospital output prices. Employment and payroll expenditures exclude most physicians, since they are not employed directly by the hospital. Appendix A provides a more detailed description of these variables and of the data quality. Figure I shows the national time series patterns for each outcome based on aggregating the hospitallevel data to the national level. Most outcomes are increasing over the entire sample period. However, beds and patient days began decreasing in the early 1960s as short-term hospitals took over many of the functions previously performed by long-term hospitals, such as treatment of tuberculosis patients [Somers and Somers 1967] ; prior to this decline, long-term hospitals constituted above 10 percent of hospitals, but half of beds and patient days. Table II reports mean hospital outcomes prior to Medicare (1962 Medicare ( -1964 . It shows that prior to Medicare, average hospital outcomes were consistently higher in the North and NorthEast (where insurance coverage was comparatively high) than in the South and West (where insurance coverage was comparatively low). This is consistent with the evidence in the paper of an impact of insurance coverage on these outcomes, but may also reflect other differences across regions.
II. The Impact of Medicare on Hospital Utilization, Inputs and Spending
II.A. Econometric model
The empirical strategy is to compare changes in outcomes in regions of the country where Medicare had a larger effect on the percentage of the elderly with health insurance to areas where it had less of an effect. Since this approach will not capture any effect of Medicare on the previously-insured that operates via Medicare's income effect, it will underestimate the full impact of Medicare.
Of course, private insurance rates prior to Medicare are not randomly assigned. Data from the 1960 census indicate that differences in socio-economic status can explain a substantial share of the variation in insurance coverage across subregions. Areas that differ in their socio-economic status may also differ in their desired level or growth of health care utilization and spending. The empirical approach is therefore to look at whether there is a break in any pre-existing differences in the level or trend of these outcomes around the time of Medicare's introduction in 1966. The identifying assumption is that absent Medicare, any pre-period differences would have continued on the same trends.
The basic estimating equation is:
(1) The dependent variable is the log of outcome y in hospital i in county j and year t; a level specification would constrain the outcomes to grow by the same absolute amount each year, which would be inappropriate given the considerable variation in size across hospitals. 1(County j ) are county fixed effects; these control for any fixed differences across counties. 1(Year t ) are year fixed effects; these control for any nationwide year effects. Mcareimpact z measures the percentage of the elderly in subregion z without private Blue Cross hospital insurance in 1963 (see Table I ).
To account for possible serial correlation over time within areas, I allow for an arbitrary variancecovariance matrix in the error structure within each hospital market. 2 The existing literature suggests the use of the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), defined in 1960, to approximate the hospital market (see e.g. Makuc et al. [1991] , Gaynor and Vogt [2000] , and Dranove et al. [1992] ). This produces 210 separate markets; I also include 50 additional markets for the rural (non-SMSA) areas in each state. To alleviate concerns that other things might also have been changing differentially over time across 2 Clustering at the market level allows for directly comparability of these results with those of subsequent analyses estimated at the market level. In practice, however, p-values are very similar if I instead cluster at the state level (see Finkelstein [2005] ), or implement the randomized inference procedure described by Bertrand et al. [2004] . different areas of the country, equation (1) 
II.B. Basic Results
The core empirical findings are readily apparent in Figure II , which shows the λ t 's from estimating equation (1) there is a dramatic reversal in this pattern after 1965, at which point admissions start to grow at the same rate or faster in the areas where Medicare's introduction had a larger impact on insurance coverage. The other five hospital outcomes examined in Figure II show the same pattern of a dramatic reversal of a generally downward or flat trend after 1965. The estimates for payroll and total expenses are somewhat noisier than the other estimates, which may reflect the greater noise in the expenditure measures (see Appendix A). The existence of a prior relative trend across more and less affected areas is not surprising given the differences across these areas in the level of hospital activity (and other characteristics) prior to Medicare, although the sign of this relative trend was not obvious a priori.
Motivated by the graphical results, I perform a variety of statistical tests of the n-year change in t λ after the introduction of Medicare relative to the n-year change in t λ before the introduction of 5 As I discuss below, estimation at the market level has its own disadvantage, namely increased noise in aggregated sums due to non-trivial amounts of missing data. 6 Data from year t are from the survey period October (t-1) to September (t 
Δ thus denotes the five-year change in the hospital outcome after the introduction of Medicare relative to the five-year change prior to the introduction of Medicare in areas where Medicare had a greater impact on insurance coverage relative to areas where it had a smaller impact. The first three rows of Table   III report the estimates for the two-year, five-year and ten-year change in the outcome, respectively; pvalues are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The results indicate that the introduction of Medicare is associated with a statistically significant increase in all of the dependent variables.
Because the reference (or pre-) period varies across the two-year, five-year, and ten-year tests, comparisons across the tests should not be interpreted as different effects at different time intervals. To compare the effects in different time intervals, the fourth row of Table III repeats Table III to estimate the implied national impact of Medicare, and present and discuss some alternative estimates.
II.C. Robustness
I investigated the robustness of the preceding results to a number of alternative specifications. Overall the results were quite robust. This section briefly summarizes some of the more important robustness tests. Many of the results are presented in Table IV , where, to conserve space, I only report the five-year estimates. To make the results comparable across different specifications, I present the implied five-year impact of Medicare. Row 1 therefore takes the baseline results from Table III and multiplies them by 0.75 since, nationwide, Medicare increased the percent of the elderly by 75 percentage points.
A primary concern is the validity of the identifying assumption that absent the introduction of Medicare, the different subregions of the country would not have exhibited divergent growth from the pre-Medicare patterns. Figure II suggests that in no year prior to 1965 (or after it for that matter) is there evidence of the dramatic reversal in trend in all outcomes that occurs after 1965. To examine this more systematically, I limit the data to the years prior to 1966 and re-estimate equation (1) and the two-year and five-year tests from Table III if -counter to fact -I assign some year prior to 1966 as the year in which Medicare was implemented. I tend not to find statistically or substantively large effects from these "false tests", which is broadly supportive of the identifying assumption (see Finkelstein [2005] for results). Further supporting the identifying assumption, row 2 of Table IV shows that the results are robust to including state-specific linear trends in equation (1), and row 3 shows that the results are robust to including additional time-varying covariates for real per capita state income, state infant mortality rate, the rate of violent crime and state population.
7 Finally, since the introduction of Medicare coincided with a period of enormous social upheaval in the South, -including the civil rights movement and the Hill Burton hospital construction program -row 4 shows that the results are robust to excluding the four southern subregions (about one-third of hospitals) from the sample. More generally, the results are robust to omitting any given subregion from the sample (see Finkelstein [2005] for results).
A related concern is that the estimated impact of Medicare might in part reflect the impact of increases in private health insurance for other age groups. However, I find no indication in the 1959, 1963 and 1970 NHS surveys of a relative increase in non-elderly private health insurance after Medicare's introduction relative to before in the more affected census regions relative to less affected census regions.
A final set of sensitivity analyses uses alternative sources of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the impact of Medicare on insurance coverage. Row 5 shows that the results are robust to using variation in insurance coverage at the subregion by-urban or subregion by-rural level instead of just variation at the subregion level. 8 Row 6 Blue Cross hospital insurance (see Table I ). Finally, row 8 shows that the results are quite similar if
Mcareimpact z is measured as the share of hospital expenditures in the subregion covered by elderly insurance, which is calculated as the percent of the elderly without BC insurance times the proportion of hospital expenses that are elderly. 9 This is not surprising since in practice there is very little variation in the percent elderly across subregions (or even across counties).
II.D. The magnitude of the impact of Medicare's introduction on aggregate spending
There are two important limitations to using the results from estimating equation (1) at the hospital level to infer the aggregate impact of Medicare. First, the analysis will not capture any effects of Medicare that operate via an impact on hospital exit or entry. Second, the analysis treats hospital of different size equally, although they may have differential responses to Medicare. This section therefore estimates alternative models to address both of these potential issues.
One way to capture any impact of Medicare that operates via an impact on hospital exit or entry is to aggregate (i.e. sum) the outcomes to the hospital market. The disadvantage of analysis at the market-level is the increased noise in the estimates due to non-trivial amounts of missing data, particularly for the expenditure measures where only about two-thirds of hospitals report the information in a given year (see Appendix A). 10 As a result, the flexibly estimated model in equation (1) (2) where m denotes the hospital market. The dependent variable now measures the log of total hospital spending (or inputs or utilization) in market m and year t.
11 Recall that a hospital market is an SMSA, or the rural (non-SMSA) part of a state.
12
The second row of Table V Table IV (not shown). They are also robust to estimating equation (4) by a GLS procedure which allows for a separate variance-covariance matrix within each market as well as a market-specific AR(1) term. The point estimates from the GLS estimation are quite similar to the OLS estimates reported in Table V (4) in which each market's observations are weighted by the number of patient days in that market in the base year (1960) . There is no systematic change in the results; some outcomes -such as admissions, employment, and payroll expenditures -are virtually unaffected. Others, such as beds and total expenditures are about 20 percent smaller. The one dramatic change is in patient days for which the effect declines in half and is no longer statistically significant.
14 Finally, an issue with both the unweighted and weighted estimates is that they produce unbiased
estimates of E(log(y|x)), not log(E(y|x)), which is the object of interest (Manning [1998] 
The bottom row of Table V reports the results of estimating the conditional expectation function in equation (5) by maximum likelihood, assuming a gamma distribution of the error term (see e.g. McCullagh and Nelder, 1989) . As in the prior row, I weight each market's observations by the number of patient days in the market in 1960, and allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each market. With the exception of the estimate for patient days, which remains insignificant but declines even more in magnitude, the other estimates are virtually indistinguishable from the weighted OLS estimates in the previous row. 13 A time series comparison of spending or admissions growth since 1965 relative to a pre-existing quadratic trend suggests that Medicare is associated with a 31 percent increase in spending by 1970, but no effect on admissions. 14 A potential issue with the weighted analysis is that the impact of Medicare on insurance coverage may also differ across markets of different size, making it difficult to distinguish heterogeneous treatment effects from heterogeneous treatments. An alternative approach would be to estimate the impact of Medicare separately for urban and rural areas, since the NHS provides separate estimates of insurance coverage for each area within each subregion. The separate estimates can then be averaged -using their relative contribution to national totals -to produce an estimate of the aggregate impact of Medicare. Deaton [1995] discusses the relative advantages of this approach and the weighting approach. Results using this alternative approach suggest that the impact of Medicare was greater in urban than in rural areas, and yield an implied national impact of Medicare on spending that is about twenty percent lower than the weighted estimate in Table V (not shown) .
I use the results from the weighted GLM analysis (row 4 in Table V) the impact of shorter-versus longer-term changes in health insurance and found no differences, suggesting that the expected permanence of Medicare relative to the Rand experiment is unlikely to be an important factor.
III. Partial Equilibrium versus General Equilibrium Effects of Health Insurance
III.A. Comparison to the Rand HIE estimates
The results from the Rand HIE indicate that moving someone from no insurance to a policy similar to Medicare's would increase their hospital spending by 37 percent.
16 Therefore, the Rand HIE would predict that moving 75 percent of the elderly from no insurance to Medicare would increase hospital spending among the elderly by 28 percent, or -as the elderly accounted 20 percent of hospital spending in 1965 -total hospital spending by 5.6 percent. This is less than one-sixth the magnitude of the 37 percent effect of Medicare on hospital spending in its first five years that I estimated above; the confidence interval on my estimate rejects the Rand point estimate with more than 99% confidence.
17
A potentially important caveat to this comparison is that the Rand experiment excluded individuals age 62 and over. It seems doubtful, however, that a larger spending response of the elderly relative to the non-elderly can explain the over six-fold higher estimated impact of Medicare. Indeed, a priori, it is not clear whether to expect that the elderly have a larger price elasticity of demand for health care (for example, because they tend to be poorer than the non-elderly), or a smaller price elasticity (for example, because their health problems are likely to be more severe.)
There are two broad classes of explanations for the empirical finding that market-wide changes in health insurance appear to have a disproportionately larger impact on the health care sector than smallscale changes in health insurance. The "fixed costs" hypothesis is that aggregate changes in health insurance may sufficiently change the nature and magnitude of the market demand for health care that 16 Medicare hospital insurance originally imposed a $40 deductible (in 1965 dollars) and no co-payment for the first 60 days. The HIE estimates suggest that the effect of moving from no insurance to a policy with no co-payment and this deductible (i.e. a $125 deductible in 1983 dollars, which are the dollars used in the reported HIE estimates) would be to increase spending from $500 to $685; see Keeler et al. [1988] and Newhouse et al. [1993] , especially pages 129-130. Accounting for the fact that Medicare imposed a 25 percent co-payment after 60 days in the hospital would only decrease the implied spending effect of Medicare from the Rand estimates. Note that although the HIE placed limits on maximum out of pocket spending, Keeler et al. [1988] describe how to estimate the effect of costsharing in the absence of such limits, and the estimates I use from the HIE follow this approach. 17 Utilization estimates from the HIE that adjust for the out of pocket maximums are not available. Nonetheless, the results of cruder comparisons also suggest that the HIE's implied impact of Medicare on hospital admissions would also be substantially lower than what I have estimated here (see Newhouse et al. [1993] , Table 3 .2).
they alter the incentives for hospitals to incur the fixed costs of entering the market or of adopting new practice styles. The "spillovers" hypothesis is that changes in insurance for one set of patients can have spillover effects to the treatment of other patients. Spillovers may arise from jointness in hospital production, medical ethics, fears of malpractice liability, or simply hospital income effects. Consistent with the presence of spillovers, several studies have found that, controlling for an individual's own insurance, average insurance coverage in a hospital or physician practice is systematically correlated with treatment intensity and spending on the individual (Baker [1997] The results are shown in Table VI . They suggest that the introduction of Medicare had a statistically significant effect on hospital entry. This is consistent with the larger estimates of the impact of Medicare at the market-level than at the hospital-level in Table V . By contrast, Medicare does not appear to have a substantively or statistically significant impact on hospital exit. Tables V and VI to decompose Medicare's five-year spending effect into the portion due to Medicare-induced hospital entry. In doing so, I account for the fact that the data prior to 1965 indicate that, on average, five years after opening, a hospital's spending is only about 40 percent that of pre-existing hospitals. Therefore, the results from the entry analysis (columns (1) and (2) of Table VI) suggests that in its first five years, Medicare-induced hospital entry may be responsible for an 18 percent (~ [0.12 x 0.75 x 5 x 0.4)) increase in hospital spending, or about half of the overall 37 percent Medicareinduced increase in hospital spending. Since Medicare appears not to have affected hospital exit, the remaining 19 percent spending effect of Medicare presumably reflects growth within existing hospitals.
I can use the results in
III.B.2 Suggestive evidence of the impact of Medicare on technology adoption
The large increase in aggregate demand associated with Medicare's introduction may also have encouraged hospitals to incur the fixed costs associated with adopting new technologies. I investigate the impact of Medicare on the adoption of new cardiac technologies; these have had an important role in both 18 Identifying entry and exit requires linking hospitals across years based on name and location. To try to distinguish genuine exit and entry from apparent exit or entry stemming from hospital non-reporting or inadequate matching, I define a hospital as exiting in year t if it is in the data in year t-1 and not in any subsequent year through 1975. Analogously, I define a hospital as entering in year t if it is in the data in year t and not in any prior year back through 1948. As a reality check, I compared my estimate of hospital entry to an alternative estimate based on the hospital's establishment date; this does not require linking hospitals across time, but unfortunately, establishment date is not reported after 1964. Using the establishment date, I estimate that hospital entry increases the number of hospitals between 1955 and 1964 by 12 percent; using the panel data approach, the analogous estimate is 17 percent. This suggests that I may overestimate entry or exit by about 40 percent. However, there is no evidence of systematic differences across subregions in my estimate of entry using the panel data approach relative to the establishment date approach. It is therefore unlikely that the estimated impact of Medicare on entry or exit is biased.
the rise in health spending and the increase in life expectancy over the last several decades [Cutler, 2003] . Columns (8) and (9) 
III.C. Suggestive evidence of spillovers
If health insurance spillovers are quantitatively important, estimates of the impact of an individual's health insurance could produce downward biased estimates of the aggregate impact of health insurance.
One reason is that most empirical analyses of the impact of an individual's health insurance use other individuals in the same market with different health insurance as a comparison group; such analysis nets out any spillover effect. Even with an empirical design that avoids this problem, it is unlikely that spillovers would be captured in a study of the impact of an individual's health insurance on health spending; the marginal impact of one's own health insurance on the typical health insurance in the community is sufficiently small that even a large spillover effect would be virtually impossible to detect.
To provide a rough gauge of the potential importance of spillovers in the current context, I calculate an alternative estimate of the impact of Medicare based on changes in spending for the elderly relative to the non-elderly. The estimates are based on individual-level survey data from the 1963 and 1970 Surveys of Health Service Utilization and Expenditures. 21 Any impact of a change in typical insurance status will impact both age groups and therefore be netted out of the estimate; the differential spending change picks up only the direct impact of one's own age group's insurance, conditional on average insurance coverage.
Consistent with potentially large spillovers, I find that analysis based on the age-variation in Medicare coverage produces substantially smaller estimates of the impact of Medicare on hospital spending than the analysis in Section II based on variation across subregions, which includes any spillover effects. Table   VIII 
IV. The spread of health insurance and the growth of health spending
Between 1950 and 1990, real per capita medical spending increased by a factor of six. Over the same 21 The 1963 survey is designed to be representative of the non-institutionalized U.S. population; the 1970 survey also excludes the institutionalized population but over samples the elderly, rural areas, and the urban poor. Neither survey includes usable population weights. Spending data is based on individual self-reports, but attempts were made to verify insurance claims with third party payers. Neither survey contains geographic identifiers. For more details see ICPSR [1988] and ICPSR [2002] .
period, the average coinsurance rate for the population (calculated as the ratio of national out of pocket health spending to national total health spending) fell by about 50 percentage points (Gibson [1978] , Cooper at al. [1976] , CMS [2004] ). Using the estimates from the Rand experiment, Manning et al. [1987] and Newhouse [1992] conclude that the spread of health insurance can explain only a very small part -on the order of one-eighth to one-tenth -of the increase in spending over this period. 22 I re-implement the same back of the envelope calculation using my central estimate of the 37 percent spending increase associated with Medicare over its first five years. Medicare also decreased the average co-insurance rate in the population by about 7 percentage points. 23 Extrapolating from this relationship implies that the 50 percentage point decrease in co-insurance rates between 1950 and 1990 would increase spending by 264 percent. The overall spread of insurance may therefore be able to explain half of the six-fold increase in real per capita health spending over this period.
My findings therefore suggest that the spread of health insurance may have played a much larger role in the substantial growth in the health care sector over the last half century than the current conventional wisdom suggests. Of course, issues of external validity suggest that the exact result from this back-of-the envelope calculation should be viewed with considerable caution; it is primarily of interest in comparison to the results of the same calculation that had previously been performed using the Rand estimates.
One issue with external validity is that Medicare may have had more of an effect on spending than the spread of other public and private health insurance due to Medicare's generous reimbursement rates, including its generous reimbursement of capital spending (Somers and Somers [1967] , United States 22 To estimate the effect of the spread of health insurance on health spending, Manning et al. [1987] and Newhouse [1992] use the Rand's estimates of spending differences between various types of plans, but not the difference between no insurance and a Medicare-like policy which is the Rand estimate I compare my results to in the rest of the paper. Also, Manning et al. [1987] and Newhouse [1992] look at the predicted effect of the spread of health insurance on spending from 1950 to 1980 or 1950 to 1984, rather than 1950 to 1990 , as I do here. However their method is easily extrapolated out to 1990 and doing so does not change the estimated contribution of health insurance. I do not extend the extrapolation beyond 1990 due to the spread after this point of managed care, which may have very different effects on health spending than traditional fee for service health insurance. 23 Medicare increased insurance coverage among the elderly by 75 percentage points, but imposed an approximately 5 percent co-pay (i.e. a one day deductible with an average length of stay for the elderly prior to Medicare of 20 days)); therefore on average it decreased the co-insurance rate for the elderly by about 71 percentage points (~ 0.75*0.95). The elderly were 10 percent of the population in 1965, therefore the average co-insurance rate for the population declined by about 7 percentage points.
Senate [1970 [ ], Feder [1977 ) which may have contributed to its apparently large effect on new hospital construction. On the other hand, it is possible that the long-run impact of Medicare is larger than the fiveyear impact used in the back of the envelope calculation. Indeed, the results in Table III indicate that the impact of Medicare on health spending rises over the second five years of its existence. Moreover, the suggestive evidence of an impact of Medicare on technology adoption raises the possibility that the increased market size for new technologies may have increased the incentives to develop new technologies, and thus the subsequent arrival rate of new technologies, as conjectured by Weisbrod [1991] . This dynamic feedback loop could produce long-run effects of Medicare on technological change and health spending beyond the ten-year post-Medicare window analyzed here. Although I can not investigate this hypothesis directly, empirical evidence of the effect of increased expected demand on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry suggests that such a feedback mechanism may be present for hospital technologies as well (Finkelstein [2004] , Acemoglu and Linn [2004] ).
V. Conclusion
By studying the introduction of Medicare, this paper has examined the impact of market-wide changes in health insurance on the health care sector. My central estimate is that Medicare is associated with a 37 percent increase in real hospital expenditures (for all ages) between 1965 and 1970. This estimate is over six times larger than what evidence from the impact of an individual's health insurance on health spending would suggest. About half of the impact of Medicare on spending appears due to the induced entry of new hospitals, while the rest is due to growth in existing hospitals. This induced hospital entry helps explain the disproportionately larger impact on health spending of market-wide changes in health insurance relative to individual-level changes. The paper also presents suggestive evidence that market-wide changes in health insurance may fundamentally alter the character of medical care both for individuals who experience a change in insurance coverage, and for those who do not as well.
A back of the envelope calculation that extrapolates from the estimated impact of Medicare to the impact of the spread of health insurance more generally suggests that the spread of health insurance between 1950 and 1990 may be able to explain about half of the six-fold rise in real per capita health spending over this time period. This raises the natural question of whether a similar mechanism can explain why most other OECD countries have also experienced sustained growth in the health care sector over the last half-century [OECD 2004] . Interestingly, like the United States, many of these countries also established their national health insurance systems in the 1960s and 1970s [Cutler 2002 ]. An important question for further work is whether other health insurance systems had a similar impact on health spending, or whether idiosyncratic features of the Medicare system resulted in a uniquely high impact. In addition, if Medicare's impact on the practice of medicine in the United States influenced treatment practices or coverage decisions in other countries' national health care systems, it is also possible that the effect of Medicare on health spending may substantially exceed its impact within the United States. This is also an interesting avenue to explore in future research. The AHA reports a response rate for the period I am studying of over 90 percent in all years, and often above 96 percent. This is considerably higher than the reported response rate in more recent decades. Conversations with the research librarian at the AHA suggest that this discrepancy may reflect the fact that the older statistics on response rate may include hospitals who respond to the survey with their name and address, even if they report no data (and are therefore not included in the published statistics). This appears corroborated by attempts by the author to track hospitals over time in the data, as hospitals often disappear for a year or two only to re-appear. Extrapolating from the frequency of such occurrences suggests a response rate of closer to 80 percent, which is more in line with data from more recent decades.
Conditional on reporting any data, virtually all responding hospitals report bed information, and about 93 percent report information on admissions, patient days, and employment. However, only about 83 percent report payroll or total expenditure information; this is probably because such information is considered more proprietary by the hospital. Hospital expenditures are therefore likely to be measured with more error than the other variables. Data are more likely to be missing in smaller hospitals and in poorer areas of the country. There is no evidence of a change in reporting patterns associated with Medicare.
Variable definitions are consistent over the period used in this study. They are as follows:
Total Expenditures. These consist of payroll and non payroll expenses. Non-payroll expenses are about 40 percent of total expenses and include employee benefits, professional fees, depreciation expenses, interest expenses, and other expenditures (supplies etc.). The AHA does not report hospital revenue during this time period; estimates of Medicare-induced changes in hospital expenditures therefore do not include any effect of the market-wide change in health insurance on the markup charged for health care services. (1967-1965 vs. 1965-1963) 0 (1970-1965 vs. 1965-1960) (1975-1965 vs. 1965-1955) (1975-1970 vs. 1965-1960) (2), and the translating the test statistic into the implied impact of Medicare. This last step is done so that the estimates are directly comparable across specifications. P-values are in parentheses and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each hospital market. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1 pct, 5 pct, and 10 pct level respectively.
• Row 1: Baseline specification: Estimates are as shown in Table III Table II for details.
• Row 2: Row 1 with state-specific linear trends included in the regression.
• Row 3: Row 1 with additional time-varying state covariates (real per capita income, infant mortality rate, violent crime, and population) added to the regression.
• Row 4: Row 1 without 4 Southern subregions (and therefore multiplying by 0.7, the average % of the elderly without BC insurance in the non-Southern United States in 1963).
• Row 5: Row 1 but with urban-and rural-specific insurance rates within each subregion (see text for details).
• Row 6: Mcareimpact z in equation (1) is measured with an indicator variable for subregion has >=75% of elderly w/o BC insurance rather than a linear measure of % of the elderly w/o BC insurance as in the baseline specification. Estimates are multiplied by 2.7 since on average areas >= 75% or more of elderly w/o BC insurance have 28 percentage points less insurance than areas where <75% of the elderly are w/o BC insurance. Weighted estimations (in rows 3 and 4) use the number of patient days in a given market in 1960 to weight each market's observations. Standard errors are (in parentheses) and are calculated allowing for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each hospital market. Implied five-year (percent) aggregate impact of Medicare is in bold {in curly brackets}. This is calculated based on the reported coefficient (β 2 from the relevant equation) and the translation (exp(β 2 x 0.75 x 5)-1); this translation accounts for the log specification, the fact that Medicare on average increased insurance coverage by 75 percentage points and that β 2 only gives a one year effect. ***,**, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Difference-in-Differences Analysis (columns 8-9) Open heart surgery facility (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) (7)
All estimates are marginal effects from probit estimation. Columns (1) through (7) report the marginal effect of Mcareimpact from estimation of equation (6); dependent variable is shown in column heading and results for cardiac technologies are in bold. Columns (8) and (9) report the marginal effect of the interaction of Mcareimpact with CARDIAC indicator from estimation of equation (7). CARDIAC is 1 for the cardiac technology in the analysis, (open heart surgery or CICU) and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for correlation within hospital markets. First row reports results from regressions without covariates. Second row reports results from a separate regression which adds controls for state-level socio-economic characteristics (specifically, real per capita state income, state infant mortality rate, violent crime rate, and state population). 
